The NATO Handbook is published by the NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division under the authority of the Secretary General as a reference book on the. Alliance . This Operations Planning handbook is aimed at helping ISSMI students in getting more Planning Course Handbook: 1. Management (CCIRM) process. Requirements Management (CCIRM), mission tasking, mission planning, sensor control and “Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting”.
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Intelligence cycle management refers to the overall activity of guiding the intelligence cyclewhich is a set of processes used to provide decision-useful information intelligence to leaders.
The cycle consists of several processes, including planning and direction the focus of this articlecollection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, and dissemination and integration. The related field of counterintelligence is tasked with impeding the intelligence efforts of others. Intelligence organizations are not infallible intelligence reports are often referred to as “estimates,” and often include measures of confidence and reliability but, when properly managed and tasked, can be among the most valuable tools of management and government.
The principles of intelligence have been discussed and developed from the earliest writers on warfare  to the most recent writers on technology. Carl Von Clausewitz – On War – One study of analytic culture  established the following “consensus” definitions:. One basic model of the intelligence process is called the “intelligence cycle”. This model can be applied  and, like all basic models, it does not reflect the fullness of real-world operations. Intelligence is processed information.
The activities of the intelligence cycle obtain and assemble information, convert it into intelligence and make it available to its users. The intelligence cycle comprises five phases:. A distinct intelligence officer is often entrusted with managing each level of the process.
In some organisations, such as the UK military, these phases are reduced to four, with the “analysis and production” being incorporated into the “processing” phase. These phases describe the minimum process of intelligence, but several other activities also come into play.
The output of the intelligence cycle, if accepted, drives operations, which, in turn, produces new material to enter another iteration of the intelligence cycle. Consumers give the intelligence organization broad directions, and the highest level sets budgets. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ISR describes an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations.
This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Sensors people or systems collect data from the operational environment during the collection phase, which is then converted into information during the processing and exploitation phase.
During the analysis and production phase, the information is converted into intelligence.
Intelligence cycle management – Wikipedia
Planning and direction activities include, but are not limited to: Leaders with specific objectives communicate their requirements for intelligence inputs to applicable agencies or contacts.
An intelligence “consumer” might be an infantry officer who needs to know what is on the other side of the next hill, a head of government who wants to know the probability that a foreign leader will go to war over a certain point, a corporate executive who wants to know what his or her competitors are planning, or any person or organization for example, a person who wants to know if his or her spouse is faithful.
Policy-makers—the president, his aides, the National Security Counciland other major departments and agencies of government—initiate requests for intelligence. Issue coordinators interact with these public officials to establish their core concerns and related information requirements. These needs are then used to guide collection strategies and the production of appropriate intelligence products  “. Intelligence requirements are determined by the commander to support his operational needs.
The commander’s requirement, sometimes called “essential elements of intelligence” EEIsinitiates the intelligence cycle. Operational and tactical intelligence always should help the commander select an action. Each intelligence source has different characteristics that can be used, but which may also be limiting. Imagery intelligence IMINTfor instance, may depend on weather, satellite orbits or the ability of aircraft to elude ground defenses, and time for analysis.
Other sources may take considerable time to collect the necessary information. Measurement and signature intelligence MASINT depends on having built a library of signatures of normal sensor readings, in order that deviations will stand out. In rare cases, intelligence is taken from such extremely sensitive sources that it cannot be used without exposing the methods or persons providing such intelligence.
One of the strengths of the British penetration of the German Enigma cryptosystem was that no information learned from it was ever used for operations, unless there was a plausible cover story that the Germans believed was the reason for Allied victories. The intelligence cycle is only a model. Budgetary and policy direction are hierarchically above it. In reality, it is not a cycle, but a series of parallel activities. According to Arthur S. Hulnick, author of What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle”Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel.
Finally, the idea that decision-makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incorrect. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it. The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counterintelligence or covert action. The architectural design must then be funded. While each nation has its own budgeting process, the major divisions of the US process are representative:.
Depending on the nation, at some level of detail, budgetary information will be classified, as changes in budget indicate changes in priorities. After considerable debate, the U. Depending on the sensitivity of a line item, it may be identified simply as “classified activity,”not broken out, but briefed to full oversight committees, or only revealed to a small number of officials.
The key is to try to get policymakers to provide guidance for both collection and analysis, to communicate not just what they want but also what they do not. The CFR proposed a “market constraint” on consumers, in which they could only get a certain amount of intelligence from the intelligence community, before they had to provide additional funding. Even with this consumer-oriented model, the intelligence community itself needs to have a certain amount of resources that it can direct itself, for building basic intelligence and identifying unusual threats.
In addition, collection should be affected by the needs of policymakers and operators. All of this argues strongly against any organizational reforms that would isolate the collection agencies further or increase their autonomy.
Especially in nations with advanced technical sensors, there is an interaction between budgeting and technology. The quantity versus quality battle is as evident in intelligence technology as in weapons systems. Western governments tend to have creative tension among their law enforcement and national security organizations, foreign-oriented versus domestic-oriented organizations, and public versus private interests.
There is frequently a conflict between clandestine intelligence and covert action, which may compete for resources in the same organization. There is an opposition between law enforcement and intelligence, because the two entities are very different. Intelligence is oriented toward the future and seeks to inform policy-makers.
It lives in an area of uncertainty where the truth may be uncertain. Because intelligence strives to protect its sources and methods, intelligence officials seek to stay out of the chain of evidence so they will not have to testify in court.
By contrast, law enforcement’s business is the prosecution of cases, and if law enforcement is to make a case, it must be prepared to reveal how it knows what it knows.
The Council on Foreign Relations  recommended that “foreign policy ought to take precedence over law enforcement when it comes to overseas operations. The bulk of U. FBI and DEA agents operating abroad should not be allowed to act independently of either the ambassador or the CIA lest pursuit of evidence or individuals for prosecution cause major foreign policy problems or complicate ongoing intelligence and diplomatic activities. The same should hold for any Defense Department personnel involved in intelligence activity overseas.
There are likely to be exceptions, and a degree of case-by-case decision-making will be inevitable. What is needed most is a Washington-based interagency mechanism involving officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and foreign policy to sort out individual cases. One now exists; the challenge is to make it work. National organizations intended for foreign operations, or military support, should operate within the home country only under specific authorization and when there is no other way to achieve the desired result Regardless, the ability of intelligence agencies to give law enforcement incidentally acquired information on U.
There should be no prohibition other than those based on policy on the intelligence community collecting information against foreign persons or entities. The question of what to do with the information, however, should be put before policymakers if it raises foreign policy concerns. Truman had legitimate concerns about creating a “Gestapo,” so he insisted that the new CIA not have law enforcement or domestic authority.
In an era of transnational terrorism and organized crime, there may not be clean distinctions between domestic and foreign activities. To be sure, private citizens and corporations were involved, but there was a neat correspondence between the threat as defined and the federal government’s national security machinery that was developed to meet that threat. The war against terrorism and homeland security will be much less a federal government monopoly. Citizens of democracies and the economy are already suffering the inconvenience and higher business costs of much tighter security.
And tragically, more ordinary citizens are likely to die from transnational terrorism. Public and private interests can both complement and conflict when it comes to economic intelligence. Multination corporations usually have a form of capable intelligence capabilities in their core business. Lloyd’s of London has extensive knowledge of maritime affairs. Oil companies have extensive information on world resources and energy demands. Investment banks can track capital flow.
These intelligence capabilities become especially difficult when private organizations seek to use national capabilities for their private benefit. Sometimes, a quid pro quo may be involved.
Nato ccirm handbook
The more sensitive reconnaissance satellites may not be needed to get substantially correct imagery. Earth resources satellites may give adequate, or even better detail—reconnaissance satellites tend not to have the multispectral scanners that are best for agricultural or other economic information. The private sector may already have good information on trade policy, resources, foreign exchange, and other economic factors.
This may not be “open ccifm in the sense of being published, but can be reliably bought from research firms that may not have the overhead cvirm all-source security.
Intelligence cycle management
The intelligence agencies can use their all-source capability for verification, rather than original collection. Intelligence agencies, working with national economic and diplomatic employees, can develop policy alternatives for negotiators.
One subtle aspect of the role of economic intelligence is the hajdbook of the continental and world economies. The economic health of Mexico clearly affects the United States, just as the Turkish economy is of concern to the European Community. In a post-Cold War environment, the roles of Russia and China are still evolving. Japan, with a history of blurred lines between industry and government, may regard a policy for them as perfectly ethical, which would be questionable in North America or Eastern Europe.
New groupings such as the Shanghai Cooperative Organization are principally economic. Economic measures also may be cdirm to pressure specific countries—for example, South Africa while it sustained a policy of apartheidor Sudan while there is widespread persecution in Darfur.